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Abstract
Scenario Planning has been around for more than 30 years and during this period a multitude of
techniques and methodologies have developed, resulting in what has been described as a
‘methodological chaos’ which is unlikely to disappear in the near future (A. Martelli, Scenario
building and scenario planning: state of the art and prospects of evolution, Futures Research
Quarterly Summer (2001)). This is reﬂected in the fact that literature reveals an abundance of
different and at times contradictory deﬁnitions, characteristics, principles and methodological ideas
about scenarios. It has been suggested that a pressing need for the future of scenarios is amongst
other things, to resolve the confusion over ‘the deﬁnitions and methods of scenarios’. This paper
makes a beginning at this need by tracing the origins and growth of scenarios and the subsequent
evolution of the various methodologies; a classiﬁcation of the methodologies into three main schools
of techniques is given and the salient features of these schools are compared and contrasted.
q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last few years, scenario planning as a strategic planning tool appears to have
enjoyed a revival in popularity judging by the increasing attention the topic has been
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4 Tel.: C44 141 553 6000; fax: C44 141 552 2501.receiving in practitioner and academic journals. Schnaars [35] states that most of what is
known about scenario planning techniques comes from three sources, namely articles,
many of which are written by scenario practitioners describing how scenario planning is
undertaken in large companies and offering experienced-based advice on the process of
carrying out scenario projects; articles from the future research literature which offer
numerous models for constructing scenarios, ‘many of which are impractical and most of
which have never been adequately tested’; and ﬁnally, a small body of research based on
empirical studies of related topics, which ‘offer some evidence as to the value of scenarios’
as a long range planning tool.
In reviewing these three sources, a number of observations can be made, the ﬁrst of
which is that rather than any consensus as to what framework scenarios belong to, there
appears to be several overlapping camps of opinion, testimony to which is the fact that the
terms planning, thinking, forecasting, analysis and learning are commonly attached to the
word scenario in the literature. The second is that there appears to be virtually no area in
scenarios on which there is wide-spread consensus; the literature reveals a large number of
different and at times conﬂicting deﬁnitions, characteristics, principles and methodologi-
cal ideas about scenarios. Mason [27] observes that the term scenario has become as ill-
deﬁned as the term strategy, while Simpson [37] suggests that the term elicits ‘all kinds of
vague and loosely deﬁned concepts’. Godet and Roubelat’s [10,13] view on this is that the
term scenario is increasingly ‘misused and abused’. The consequence of all of this
according to Khakee [18] is that ‘few techniques in futures studies have given rise to so
much confusion as scenarios’. The third observation is that there are a plethora of scenario
development models and techniques, the result of which is that the ‘present
methodological chaos’ which ‘will not fade away in the foreseeable future’ [26].
As a consequence of the foregoing, Millet [30] suggests that one of the major issues to
be addressed ‘for the future of the scenario method’ is to ‘resolve the confusion over the
deﬁnitions and methods of scenarios’. The contribution this paper seeks to make to the
literature is to begin to address this confusion by tracing the origins and growth of
scenarios and the subsequent evolution of the various methodologies, which are classiﬁed
into the main schools of techniques, and the salient features of these schools are then
compared and contrasted. In doing so, it should be recognized that the province of scenario
planning is wide ranging and includes the following:
† crisis management such as civil defense exercises in which scenarios are used in the
form of simulations of future crisis situations, to design and test the suitability of
systems and equipment to respond to the situations, and to increase response
preparedness;
† the scientiﬁc community who use scenarios as a means of communicating the
increasing degree of complexity of scientiﬁc models and theory in a more readily and
widely understandable format. Examples of this include scenarios for the development
of climate change based on environmental computer models and scenarios for
economic development based on econometric models;
† public policy makers who are increasingly using scenarios as forum to involve multiple
agencies and stakeholders in policy decisions, enabling joined-up analysis and creating
an accommodation platform to assist policy implementation. An example in this area is
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Saunders [34]:
† professional futurist institutes of which there are many; most are independent research
and membership organizations working to spread ideas regarding critical trends that
will shape the future, and to promote future research methodologies;
† educational institutes which aim to promote the research and development of future
studies theories and methods, and create a learning environment so that issues are
considered within an evolving futures context. Well known institutes in this context
include the Hawaii Research Centre for Future Studies within the University of Hawaii
at Manoa and the Australian Foresight Institute at Southern Cross University; and
† businesses which use scenario planning as a long range planning tool.
While the ﬁrst half of this paper on the origins of scenarios applies to all of the above,
the second half which focuses on the evolution of scenarios, does so primarily in the
context of long range business planning.
2. The origins of scenarios
The concept of scenarios is an old one, since earliest recorded time people have been
interested in the future and have used scenarios as a tool for indirectly exploring the future
of society and its institutions. In this context, scenarios have usually taken the form of
treatises on utopias and dystopias and as such, have a long history which can be traced
back to the writings of the early philosophers, such as Plato’s description of his ideal
Republic [41,45] and visionaries from Thomas More to George Orwell. However, as a
strategic planning tool, scenario techniques are ﬁrmly rooted in the military and have been
employed by military strategists throughout history, generally in the form of war game
simulations [2]. Despite their long history in the military the ﬁrst documented outlines of
what today might be regarded as scenarios, do not appear until the 19th century in the
writings of von Clausewitz and von Moltke, two Prussian military strategists also credited
with having ‘ﬁrst formulated the principles of strategic planning’ [41]. Modern day
scenario techniques however, only emerged in the post-war period, and the1960s saw the
emergence of two geographical centres in the development of scenario techniques, the
USA and France.
3. Foundations of ‘The USA Centre’
After World War II, the US Department of Defense was faced with the task of deciding
what projects should be funded for the development of new weapons systems, a difﬁcult
undertaking given the increasing complexity of weapons systems arising from advances
made in the sciences during the war years. Adding to the difﬁculty of the assignment was
the signiﬁcant uncertainty faced on three fronts by the decision makers. Firstly, the end
result of the development of new weapons systems which generally required long lead
times was itself uncertain. Secondly, with the lowering of the ‘iron curtain’ there was
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being developed would be deployed; and ﬁnally uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the
systems ultimately developed as this would be largely dependent upon what weapons
systems other nations were developing [33].
The decision making in this situation gave rise to two speciﬁc needs, namely:
† the need for a methodology to capture the reliable consensus of opinion of a large and
diverse group of experts; and
† the need to develop simulation models of future environments which would permit
various policy alternatives and their consequences to be investigated.
The need to elicit and synthesize expert opinion inspired the development of the Delphi
technique, and the need for simulation models led to the development of an approach
known as ‘systems analysis’, from which emerged the explicit use of scenario techniques
[33]. Both these techniques were developed in the 1950s by The Rand Corporation (an
acronym from Research and Development), a research group which evolved out of a joint
project between the US Airforce and the Douglas Aircraft company in 1946 and which up
until the 1960s, was engaged almost exclusively in Defense management studies for the
US Airforce [4].
It was the combination of the development of computers (which provided the data
processing capability required for simulating solutions for ‘otherwise intractable
problems’), game theory (which provided the theoretical structure for the investigation
of social interaction) and the US military’s need for war game simulation models, which
provided the platform for the emergence of scenario techniques at the Rand Corporation
[36]. Using this platform, Herman Kahn, the ranking authority on Civil Defense and
strategic planning at the Rand Corporation in the 1950s, began developing scenarios for
the Air Defense System Missile Command, a large scale early warning system. Kahn,
variously described as a ‘supergenius’ and a ‘policy intellectual of unquestioned genius’
developed a disturbing critique of US military strategy in the thermonuclear age [3].
Credited with having coined the phrase ‘thinking about the unthinkable’, Kahn
demonstrated through a combination of facts and logic, that military planning tended to
be based on wishful thinking rather than ‘reasonable expectations’. The existing doctrine
he contended was disastrous, and he demonstrated this by developing scenarios of a
‘nuclear war by miscalculation’ [30]. The objective of using scenarios as a vehicle to think
about the unthinkable was to search for serious alternatives to annihilation and surrender,
and his work had a major impact on the Pentagon’s thinking in the 1950s and 1960.
However, due to the specialised and classiﬁed nature of this work, the content and
methodology of this modern day pioneering scenario work were not widely publicised
until 1960 when Kahn published a book entitled On Thermonuclear War.
In 1961, Khan left the Rand Corporation and established the Hudson Institute where he
began to apply his scenario methodology to social forecasting and public policy. He
subsequently authored or coauthored numerous newspaper, magazine and journal articles
and published books many incorporating ‘futuristic’ scenarios, the most controversial of
which was The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years,
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regarded as a landmark in the ﬁeld of scenario planning because according to Raubitschek:
† it provided one of the earliest deﬁnitions of ’scenarios’ and introduced the word into the
planning literature;
† it demonstrated the use of scenarios as a methodological tool for policy planning and
decision making in complex and uncertain environments;
† it strongly inﬂuenced the subsequent development and diffusion of scenario techniques
as planning tools in the US, by providing a methodological foundation for other similar
future studies; and
† it generated much controversy which led to numerous counter studies, for example, the
Club of Rome Reports, The Limits to Growth (Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L.,
Randers, J. and Behrens III, W.W., 1972) and Mankind at the Turning Point (Mesarovic
and Pestel, 1974), which were just as controversial and served to heighten the focus of
attention on scenarios and scenario techniques.
As a consequence of the above, Kahn is often referred to in the literature as the ‘father’
of modern-day scenario planning [4].
Soon after his departure from the Rand Corporation two other Rand alumnae, Helmer
and Gordon also left and founded the Institute of the Future. Encouraged by the publicity
and controversy caused by Khan’s books, Helmer, Gordon and Dalkey along with several
individuals at the Stanford Research Institute ‘Futures Group’ (SRI) and the California
Institute of Technology, began to experiment with scenarios as a planning tool and became
the pioneers in the ﬁeld offuture studies in the US. Although as with Kahn, these pioneers
were concerned initially with scenarios as a tool for public policy planning, it was not long
before their work migrated to the business community and the ﬁrst widely documented use
of scenarios in the context of business was the experience of the Royal Dutch Shell
company (Shell) which adopted scenario planning as a permanent strategy in 1972–1973
[23] and along with the work of SRI, gave rise to what Godet [11] describes as the Anglo-
American School of scenario planning for obvious reasons, but it is better known in the
literature as the ‘Intuitive Logics’ school or methodology of scenario planning [16].
3.1. The intuitive logics school
In 1967, Shell initiated the ‘Year 2000‘ study, a project to study the business
environment that would exist in 2000. The study revealed that there would be a
discontinuity in the oil industry, the historical trajectory of year-on-year expansion of the
industry could not continue to 1985, let alone 2000. As a consequence of this revelation, a
number of Shell companies were tasked in 1969, to look ahead to the year 1985 in an
initiative known as the ‘Horizon Planning’ exercise. Pierre Wack, a planner at Shell
Francaise, one of the participating companies in the exercise, was familiar with the
scenarioapproach developed by Kahn, and decided to experiment with the technique using
France as the testing ground. The initial attempt at scenarios was not a success in that it
resulted in what Wack [44] labeled ‘ﬁrst generation scenarios’ which were useful in
gaining a better understanding of situations, but provided no insights beyond what was
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discovered a useful search tool’ and ‘the technique had promise’. Meanwhile the Horizon
Planning Initiative had conﬁrmed the ﬁndings of the Year 2000 study which prompted the
decision in Shell to experiment with scenario planning as a potentially better framework
for thinking about the future rather than continuing to rely on conventional forecasts which
were likely to be wrong in the face of a discontinuity [19,44]. The initial scenarios
developed in 1971 on an experimental basis and presented to senior management in 1972,
proved extraordinarily successful in that they correctly identiﬁed an impending scarcity of
oil and an ensuing pointed increase in oil prices; shortly thereafter scenario planning was
extended throughout the company.
Coincidently, GE began to experiment with scenarios at about the same time as Shell
and in 1971 produced four alternative scenarios of global and US economic and socio-
political conditions in 1980. However, unlike Shell, there is very little in the public domain
regarding GE and scenarios, and Shell has become the most celebrated corporate exponent
of scenarios, its deﬁnition of scenarios and process methods have become the de facto
‘gold standard of corporate scenario generation’ [30] which is why the intuitive logics
methodology is sometimes referred to as the ‘Shell approach’ to scenarios.
Numerous variations of the intuitive logics model have since been published, each
identifying a number of discrete steps, varying from ﬁve [7] to 15 or more [42], depending
on what features of scenarios are highlighted or ignored. Some practitioners have
elaborated and branded proprietary scenario developmental models, examples of which
are Future Mappingw, an approach used by Northeast Consulting Resources Inc. based in
Massachusetts [27]; TAIDAe (an acronym for ‘Tracking, Analysing, Imaging, Deciding,
Acting’), an approach developed at Kairos Future in Sweden [20], and Idon Scenario
Thinking, an approach using visual tools developed by the Idon Group in Scotland [8].A t
the same time, there have been efforts to develop simpler and less resource intensive
models which focus on scenario planning as a process of learning, as is demonstrated in
the work of Mercer [28] and van der Heijden et al. [39] with MBA students in UK Business
Schools.
In fact when it come to the intuitive logics model, a large part of the ‘methodological
chaos’ referred to in the introduction arises from the observation that there are almost as
many ways of developing scenarios as there are practitioners in the ﬁeld. However, while
the intuitive logics methodology has received most of the attention in the literature, almost
in parallel with it a further ‘school’ of scenario techniques involving the probabilistic
modiﬁcation of extrapolated trends evolved out of the work of Gordon, Helmer and others
at the RAND Corporation in the USA.
3.2. The probabilistic modiﬁed trends school
This school of scenario planning incorporates two distinct methodologies, Trend-
Impact Analysis and Cross-Impact Analysis.
3.2.1. Trend-impact analysis (TIA)
The TIA model developed in the early 1970s in the ﬁeld offutures research, and is most
often associated with the Futures Group based in Connecticut. According to Gordon [14],
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of historic data without considering the effects of unprecedented future events. The
concept of TIA is a relatively simple one designed to modify simple extrapolations and in
essence, involves four steps:
† historical data relating to the issue being examined is collected;
† an algorithm is used to select speciﬁc curve-ﬁtting historical data and extrapolate this to
generate ‘surprise-free’ future trends;
† a list of unprecedented future events which could cause deviations from the
extrapolated trend is developed; and
† expert judgments are then used to identify the probability of occurrence of these
unprecedented events as a function of time and their expected impact, to produce
adjusted extrapolations.
Although, Gordon [14] states that ‘the TIA method is used frequently’, references to
TIA in context of scenarios, are relatively few in the literature.
3.2.2. Cross-impact analysis (CIA)
The CIA model was developed by Gordon and Helmer in 1966 at the RAND
Corporation as a forecasting game for Kaiser-Aluminium, and subsequently programmed
by Gordon and Hayward. A range of causal and correlation cross-impact variants have
since been developed by researchers, along with a number of proprietary methodologies
including IFS (Interactive Future Simulations—previously known as BASICS) developed
by the Battelle Memorial Institute [30], INTERAX (Interactive Cross-Impact Simulation)
developed by Enzer at the University of California, and SMIC (French acronym for Cross
Impact Systems and Matrices) developed by Duperrin and Gabus [14].
As with TIA, the CIA methodology attempts to evaluate changes in the probability of
occurrence of events which might cause deviations in the naı ¨ve extrapolations of historical
data. The processes underlying the two methodologies are similar but CIA incorporates an
additional layer of complexity in that rather than accepting the a priori probabilities
attached to future events by experts, it attempts to determine the conditional or
proportional probabilities of pairs of future events given that various events have or have
not occurred, through cross impact calculations. The premise of CIA is that it is essential
to take cognizance of the interdependencies of events in order to move from a system of
‘unprocessed initial probabilities’ to a set of ‘corrected probabilities’ [9].
Although TIA and CIA began life as essentially standalone probabilistic forecasting
tools, they generate a range of alternative futures rather than a single point naı ¨ve
extrapolation of historical data, and when combined with judgments and narratives about
the events in these futures, they constitute scenarios.
4. Foundations of ‘The French Centre’
In Europe meanwhile, the French are reputed to have been the ﬁrst to have
systematically studied the ‘scientiﬁc and political foundations of the future’ using scenario
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associated with public policy and planning. At the same time that Khan was developing
scenarios for the military in the 1950s, Gaston Berger a French philosopher founded the
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives where he developed a scenario approach to long-term
planning, which he named prospective thinking or La Prospective. This approach
reportedly emerged as a consequence of the repeated failure of ‘classical’ forecasting
approaches [9].
Berger was concerned with the long-term political and social future of France and the
underlying philosophical premise of his work was that the future is not part of a
‘predetermined temporal continuity’ but something which is to be created and which can
be ‘consciously modeled to be humanly beneﬁcial’. The primary objective of the
Prospectives centre was to formulate an acceptable scenario-based methodology for
developing positive images or ‘normative scenarios’ of the future and to lead these images
into the political arena where they could serve as a guiding vision to policy makers and the
nation, providing a basis for action [15,43]. Although Berger died in 1960, the
Prospectives centre ﬂourished and by the mid 1960s it had begun to apply the La
Prospective methodology to a range of public issues including education, the environment,
urbanisation and regional planning, the ﬁrst reported application being the study of
regional futures by an interdepartmental government organization known as DATAR (the
Ofﬁce for Regional Planning and Development) [12].
The pioneering work of Berger was continued on through the 1960s and 1970s by two
individuals, Pierre Masse and Bertrand de Jouvenel. As the Director of national economic
planning in France in the 1960s, Masse introduced the use of the prospective scenario
approach in the development of the fourth French National Plan (1960–1965) and
subsequent national economic plans have purportedly continued to use prospective
scenario techniques [14]. Meanwhile, de Jouvenel, the founder of the Futuribles Group
(Association Internationale de Futuribles) which became a catalyst in the development of
the international futures movement, joined the Prospectives centre in 1966. de Jouvenel
[5] postulated that it was the particular view of the future held by small but dominant
political groups within a nation, which determined how the future of that nation unfolded.
This could be avoided he argued, by encouraging futurists to act as catalysts in articulating
idealistic images of what the future could be like and which could serve as a blueprint for
the nation. The thrust of de Jouvenel’s work therefore was in using scenarios to construct
positive images of the future or ‘scientiﬁc utopias’ and then specifying ways in which
these could be brought about to improve the life of ordinary people [6].
Since the 1970s, the work of the French pioneers has been expanded on by Michel
Godet, who has spent many years ‘honing the tools of La Prospective’ [11].
4.1. The La prospective school
In the mid-1970s Godet, the then head of the Department of Future Studies at SEMA (a
ﬁrm active in the defense sector), began to develop scenarios for several French national
institutions such the electricity company (EdF) and Elf. Although ﬁrmly rooted in the La
Perspective methodology developed by Berger, Godet began to develop his own largely
mathematical and computer-based probabilistic approach to scenario development, which
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systems analysis tools and procedures’, including morphological analysis for scenario
building, Micmac for identifying key variables, Mactor for analysis of actors’ strategies
and Smic-Prob-Expert for determining the probability of scenarios (Micmac, Mactor and
Smic are all acronyms for speciﬁc computer programmes developed by Godet). Despite
these differences, the collectivity of the systems developed by the Futuribles Group and
Godet have since come to be known as the French school of La Prospective; however the
term covers a range of concepts, and Godet [12] suggests that as used by him, the term is
best translated as ‘strategic scenario building’.
The main differentiating feature between the US and the French centres of scenario
development is that whereas the early scenario work in the US tended to be of a global
nature, scenario development in France was more narrowly focused on the socio-political
foundations of the future of France itself [43].There has since been a diffusion of scenarios
into the business community, however, scenario work in France continues to have an
important role in public sector planning. Meanwhile although the La Prospective approach
to scenarios incorporates certain features of the Intuitive logics methodology, it is a more
elaborate, complex and more mechanistic rather than an openly intuitive approach to
scenarios development, relying heavily on computer-based mathematical models which
have their roots in TIA and CIA. Thus while Godet [11] characterises La Prospective as a
‘blend of tools and systems analysis’, it is to a large extent, a blending of the intuitive
logics and probabilistic modiﬁed trend methodologies.
Although as can be seen from the foregoing, the La Prospective school has been in
existence for almost as long as the intuitive logics and probabilistic modiﬁed trends
schools, it has received considerably less attention in the literature on scenario planning.
This asserts Godet [11] is a consequence of the ‘Anglo-American domination in any area
related to strategy’.
5. The growth of scenarios
Studies of European companies by Malaska [24], Malaska et al. [25] and Meristo [29]
clearly indicates that in Europe:
† scenario planning was not widely used until after the ﬁrst oil crises in 1973, following
which the number of ‘adopters’ of scenario planning almost doubled; and
† there was a further surge of adoption in the period between 1976 and 1978. This led
Malaska et al. to conclude that the adoption of scenario planning ‘is associated with the
increasing unpredictability of the corporate environment that took place in the 1970s’.
The above ﬁndings also hold in the US. Studies by Linneman and Klein [21,22] found
that there were few business users of scenario planning techniques prior to 1974 but in the
two year period (1974–1975) following the ﬁrst oil crises, the number of adopters doubled
and then more than doubled againin the period between 1977 and 1981. They estimate that
in the early 1980s, almost half of all US Fortune 1000 industrial ﬁrms, US Fortune 300
non-industrial ﬁrms and Fortune Foreign 500 industrial ﬁrms were actively using scenario
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there is a correlation between the adoption of scenario planning and ‘environmental
discontinuities and instability’.
The 1981 US based survey evidence of Linneman and Klein also revealed that the use
of scenarios was not uniform among various industry groupings and that the adoption of
scenario techniques in business appears to be related to three factors, these being:
† the size of the company; by 1981, 46% of the Fortune 1000 industrials reportedly used
scenarios. Among the largest of the Fortune 1000, the Fortune 100, the reported usage
was in excess of 75% of the companies surveyed;
† the length of its planning horizons; the majority of companies (72%) that used scenarios
had planning horizons of 10 or more years; and
† capital intensiveness; the majority of scenario users tended to be in capital intensive
industries such as aerospace, chemicals and petroleum reﬁning.
In Europe, the survey results of Malaska et al. [25] revealed a similar picture, i.e. that
the highest proportion of scenario users were large companies operating in capital
intensive industries with long strategic planning horizons, namely, oil companies, vehicle
manufacturers, electricity suppliers and transport companies. The ﬁnding that scenarios
are used predominantly by large companies is perhaps explained by the fact that it is
generally large companies which have both the resources and the inclination to experiment
with new planning models.
TheresearchofLinnemanandKleinandMalaskaetal.discussedaboveclearlyindicates
that there was substantial growth in the adoption of scenario techniques throughout the
1970s, although by 1981 the rate of adoption of scenarios in the US was markedly higher
than it was in Europe. The growth in scenario popularity is, however, contradicted by van
Doorn and Vught, [40] who state that between 1973 and 1980 there was a ‘decline in
preference for scenarios’, especially in the US where the preference for scenarios moved
from ‘high’ to ‘medium’ (Table 5, page 510). The basis of their research is the analysis of
fourstudies,twointheUS(1973and1980)andtwoinEurope(theNetherlandsin1976and
the FDR in 1978) of how individuals and organisations rated techniques of future studies.
They attribute this decline to the fact that from simple beginnings in the 1960z, scenario
methods quickly evolved into ‘a complex of sub-techniques’ which rendered it difﬁcult to
implement and ‘impossible to toss off a few complete scenarios on a rainy afternoon’. To
justify this assertion, they cite research ﬁndings [1,31] which indicate that the perceived
usefulnessofatechniqueandultimatelyitsadoptionisdirectlyproportionaltotheeffortand
the sophistication required to implement the technique.
There is no empirical data in the literature which documents the popularity of scenario
techniques between the early 1980s and today, although there is anecdotal evidence to the
effect that scenarios declined in popularity during the 1980s. Martelli [26] suggests that
while the use of scenarios ‘goes and comes in waves’, it has ‘grown in the last one or two
decades but not that much and probably less than could be expected’. Several reasons are
offered for this including the contention that ‘scenario practitioners have so far had only
limited success in ﬁnding a good balance between an excess of technicality on the one
side, and a relapse into superﬁciality on the other’.
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have entree to the corridors of power”, but he also notes that “in some sense the early
pioneers were inﬂuential beyond their wildest dreams. The forecasting techniques, the
trend analysis and market predictions spawned by futurologists are today widely used in
government and private business”. This would presumably include scenario techniques.
Thus while futurology may have declined in popularity, scenarios it would appear are now
enjoying a resurgence in popularity, as measured by the recent number of articles and
conferences on the subject [27]. Although there is no empirical survey data to substantiate
this, a search of the Science Citation Index database reveals a dramatic surge in scenario
references beginning in 1992 and continuing through to 2000. At the same time, there has
been a proliferation of examples of scenario work in the public domain, as even a cursory
search of the web will conﬁrm. Thus while there popularity of scenarios may have moved
in waves which correlate to the state of uncertainty in the business environment, they are
here to stay concludes Martelli [26].
6. Discussion
In a widely cited paper, Huss and Honton [16] identify three major categories of
approaches to scenario development, namely ‘Intuitive Logics’, ‘Trend-Impact Analysis’
and ‘Cross-Impact Analysis’. There is no discussion on the La Prospective methodology,
testimony in part perhaps to Godet’s assertion that Anglophones have tended to dominate
the world of strategy and its tools. This paper aims to remedy this omission; at the same
time, it is our contention that although TIA and CIA are standalone techniques, they share
a common foundation which is the mathematical amelioration of extrapolated time series
data; they can therefore be justiﬁably viewed as a coherent group of techniques which for
convenience we have labeled the as ‘probabilistic modiﬁed trends’ (PMT) methodology.
Consequently, we argue that there are indeed three major categories of scenario ‘schools’
or techniques, but they are the Intuitive Logics, the Probabilistic Modiﬁed Trends and the
La Prospective methodologies. A comparison of the salient features of each of these three
schools is detailed in Table 1 and discussed below.
Fig. 1. Purposeful Scenario Work.
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Heijden et al. [39] is the degree to which a scenario project is ‘purposeful’. Although, no
empirical evidence is offered to support this, the authors contend that the purpose of
scenario work can be categorised along two dimensions: (1) the work can either serve
speciﬁc one-off content needs, or an on-going general process aimed at longer-term
survival capability; (2) the work can be undertaken either to open up an organizational
mind for exploration, or to achieve closure on speciﬁc decisions and actions. Combining
these dimensions provides a two dimensional matrix as illustrated in Fig. 1, which
identiﬁes four main areas of purpose in scenario work:
† making sense of a particular puzzling situation;
† developing strategy;
† anticipation; and
† adaptive organisational learning.
The ﬂexibility of the intuitive-logics methodology lends itself to a wide range of
scenario purposes as it evidenced by the fact that examples of the application of the
methodology to all four of the above ‘purposes’ can be found in the literature. While both
the La Prospective and PMT may be theoretically applicable to a range of purposes, the
objective of scenario work under these methodologies is generally to determine the most
likely evolutionary development of a particular phenomenon with a view to improving the
effectiveness of policy and strategic decisions. Consequently, scenario work under these
methodologies generally falls in the left-hand quadrants of the ‘purposeful scenario work
matrix’—the work tends to be a one-off exercise associated with ‘making sense’ of a
particular situation or with ‘developing strategy’.
At the same time, whereas the perspective of intuitive-logics base scenario work can be
either descriptive or normative and the scope extremely broad as in the development of
global scenarios or narrowly focused on a particular issue, both the La Prospective and
PMT models tend to be descriptive in perspective, and focus on a speciﬁc phenomenon
and the set of key variables which bear on the future of that particular phenomenon. The
PMT models are further limited in terms of the scope of issues to be investigated by the
need to have detailed and reliable time series data. Common to all three methodologies is
that the scenario horizon year typically spans a period of between 3 and 20 years, but
longer horizon periods are also found, particularly where the focus of the scenarios is a
broad one.
The methodological orientation of the intuitive logics methodology is ﬁrmly a process
orientation as evidenced by quotations in the literature indicating that the insights and
learning arising from the process are more important that the reliability of the content of
the end product, the scenarios. The approach taken to develop scenario can be either
inductive or deductive, but all approaches are subjective and largely qualitative in nature,
relying fundamentally on what Jungermann and Thuring [17] refer to as ‘disciplined
intuition’. Meanwhile the La Prospective and PMT are both essentially outcome oriented.
Subjectivity and intuition of course play a role in both these methodologies, but in the
main the approaches used are directed and objective and revolve largely around complex
R. Bradﬁeld et al. / Futures 37 (2005) 795–812 806Table 1
Comparison of the Salient Features of the Three Schools of Scenario Techniques
Intuitive-Logics Models La Prospective Models Probabilistic Modiﬁed
Trend Models
Purpose of the scenario
work:
Multiple, from a once-
off activity making sense
of situations and devel-
oping strategy, to an
ongoing activity associ-
ated with anticipation
and adaptive organis-
ational learning.
Usually a once-off
activity associated with
developing more effec-
tive policy and strategic
decisions and tactical
plans of action.
A once-off activity to
enhance extrapolative
prediction and policy
evaluation.
Scenario perspective: Descriptive or norma-
tive.
Usually descriptive, can
be normative.
Descriptive.
Scope of the scenario
exercise:
Can be either broad or
narrow scope ranging
from global, regional,
country, industry to an
issue speciﬁc focus.
Generally a narrow
scopebutexamination of
a broad range of factors
within the scope.
Narrow scope focused
on the probability and
impact of speciﬁc events
on historic trends.
Scenario horizon year: Varies: 3–20 years. Varies: 3–20 years. Varies: 3–20 years.
Methodological orien-
tation:
Process orientation -
inductive or deductive,
essentially subjective
and qualitative in
approach relying on dis-
ciplined intuition.
Outcome orientation -
directed and objective,
quantitative and anlyti-
cal approaches (with
some subjectivity) rely-
ing on complex compu-
ter-based analysis and
mathematical modeling.
Outcome orientation-
directed and objective,
quantitative and analyti-
cal approaches (with
some subjectivity) using
computer-based extra-
polative forecasting and
simulation models.
Nature of scenario team
participants:
Internal - scenarios
developed by a facili-
tated from within the
organization.
Combination of some
key individuals from
within the organization
led by an expert external
consultant.
External - scenario
exercise undertaken by
expert external consult-
ants.
Role of external Expters: Experienced scenario
practitioner to design
and facilitate the pro-
cess; periodic use of
remarkable people as
catalysts of new ideas.
Dominant - expert-led
process using an array of
proprietary tools to
undertake comprehen-
sive analysis and expert
judgments to determine
scenario probabilities.
Dominant - expert-led
process using proprie-
tary tools and expert
judgments to identify
high impact unprece-
dented future events and
their probability of
occurrence.
Tools commonly used: Generic - brainstorming,
STEEP analysis, clus-
tering, matrices, system
dynamics and stake-
holder analysis
Proprietary - structural
(Micmac) and actor
(Mactor) analysis, mor-
phological analysis,
Delphi, SMIC Prob-
Expert, Multipol and
Multicriteria evaluation.
Proprietary Trends
Impact and Cross Impact
Analysis, Monte Carlo
simulations.
Scenario starting point: A particular manage-
ment decision, issue or
area of general concern.
A speciﬁc phenomenon
of concern.
Decisions/issues for
which detailed and
reliable time series data
exists.
(continued on next page)
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development of scenarios.
Signiﬁcant differences exist between the three scenario methodologies in terms of the
nature of scenario team participants and the role of experts in the scenario process. Under
the intuitive logics methodology the scenario development process is customarily carried
out by a team of individuals from within the organization undertaking the scenario work.
External experts are used in two ways; ﬁrstly the process is commonly designed and
facilitated by an experienced scenario planning practitioner. Secondly, outside experts in
Table 1 (continued)
Intuitive-Logics Models La Prospective Models Probabilistic Modiﬁed
Trend Models
Identiﬁcation/selection
of key driving forces:
Intuition - brainstorming
techniques, analysis of
STEEP factors, research,
and discussion with
remarkable people.
Interviews with actors
involved in the phenom-
enon being studied and
comprehensive struc-
tural analysis using
sophisticated computer
tools.
Fitting curves to histori-
cal time series data to
identify trends and use
of expert judgment to
create database of
potential high impact
unprecedented future
events.
Establishing the scenario
set:
Deﬁning the scenario
logics as organizing
themes or principles
(often in the form of
matrices).
Matrices of sets of
probable assumptions
based on key variables
for the future.
Monte Carlo simulations
to create an envelope of
uncertainty around base
forecasts of key indi-
cators.
Scenario Exercise Out-
put:
Qualitative - set of
equally plausible scen-
arios in discursive nar-
rative form supported by
graphics, some limited
quantiﬁcation. Impli-
cations, strategic options
and early warning sig-
nals increasingly a part
of scenario output.
Quantitative and quali-
tative - multiple scen-
arios of alternative
futures supported by
comprehensive analysis
incorporating possible
actions and their conse-
quences.
Quantitative - baseline
case plus upper and
lower quartiles of
adjusted time series
forecasts. may be
embellished by short
storylines.
Probabilities attached to
scenarios:
No, all scenarios must be
equally probable.
Yes, probability of the
evolution of variables
under assumption sets of
actors’ behaviour.
Yes, conditional prob-
ability of occurrence of
unprecedented and dis-
ruptive future events.
Number of Scenarios
generated:
Generally 2–4. Multiple. Usually 3–6 dependent
on the number of simu-
lations.
Scenario evaluation cri-
teria:
Coherence, comprehen-
siveness, internal con-
sistency, novelty -
underpinned by rigorous
structural analysis and
logics. All scenarios
equally plausible.
Coherence, comprehen-
siveness, internal con-
sistency - underpinned
by rigorous structural
and mathematical anal-
ysis; plausible and ver-
iﬁable in retrospect.
Plausible and veriﬁable
in retrospect.
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acute observers of the environment, may be brought into the process at particular junctures
in order to challenge and stimulate the thinking of the scenario team. The starting point of
scenario work under this methodology depends on the purpose of the scenario
undertaking, but is generally related to a particular management issue or area of general
concern, which in turn determines the focus in terms of the driving forces to be examined.
Although the processes and tools used by scenario practitioners to achieve this vary, they
are basically generic and include desk research, individual and group brainstorming and
clustering techniques, contextual environment analysis using the Societal, Technology,
Economic, Environment, Technology (STEEP) framework or its derivatives, matrices,
systems dynamics, stakeholder analysis and discussions with remarkable people.
The above contrasts sharply with both the La Prospective and PMT techniques in which
external experts unavoidably play a dominant role as consultants in designing and then
carrying out the scenario exercise. This is because the complex and sophisticated
mathematical analysis, forecasting and modeling tools utilized by La Prospective and
PMT are not ordinarily resident in organizations, they are usually the proprietary tools of
consulting organizations. In the case of La Prospective, having identiﬁed the speciﬁc
phenomenon of concern to the management of the client organization as the starting point,
key individuals from within the organisation are then generally involved in various stages
of the process; however, the process is essentially that of an external consultant-led
exercise employing an arsenal of sophisticated structural analysis and cross impact tools to
identify “as exhaustive a list as possible of the variables which deﬁne the system formed
by the phenomenon under study” [12]. Under the PMT process the starting point of the
scenario work similarly revolves around management decisions and concerns, but as
previously noted, is constrained by issues for which reliablehistoric time series data exists.
Involvement of individuals from within the client organization is in most cases nominal,
and the primary role of the consultant is to gather the expert judgments of external experts
as input to their sophisticated, computer-based tools including Monte Carlo simulations, to
arrive at modiﬁed time series forecasts.
The ﬁnal output of the intuitive logics methodology is a coherent set of logically
linked scenarios in discursive narrative form and the narratives are often embellished
with pictures, newspaper clippings and vivid graphics for effect, most of which are
contrived. Both the La Prospective and PMT techniques also result in scenarios to
which narratives are commonly attached; the scenarios may include numerical data in
graphical form, but the data is not contrived, and pictures and other visual material
are seldom added for effect. However, the foremost difference between scenarios
developed under the intuitive logics methodology versus those developed under a
La Prospective or PMT methodology, is the issue of probability. Scenarios developed
under the latter two approaches are presented as the ‘most probable’ scenarios, i.e. a
base case plus upper and lower limit scenarios based on probabilities assigned to the
scenarios, whereas the hallmark of scenarios developed under intuitive logics
approaches is that all scenarios presented are equally probable. Consequently, while
‘coherence’, ‘plausibility’, ‘internal consistency’ and ‘logical underpinning’ are the
common baseline criteria by which all scenarios are evaluated regardless of
developmental methodology, unique to the intuitive logics model is the additional
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the outcome rather than process orientation of scenario work under the La Prospective
and PMT methods, scenarios derived under these approaches are subject to an
additional evaluation criteria, ‘veriﬁability in retrospect’.
All of the above discussion summarized in Table 1 focuses on the main points of
commonality and departure between the three major schools of scenario planning. Two
ﬁnal observations in this respect are that:
† ﬁrstly while the differences between the intuitive logics and the PMT approaches and
La Prospective and PMT are readily apparent, the distinction between intuitive logics
and La Prospective approaches has blurred somewhat. Fundamental differences still of
course exist particularly in terms of methodological orientation, nature of participants
and the role of experts in the process, but the range and sophistication of tools
advocated in some of the more recent variants of the intuitive logics models are similar
in nature to those on which the La Prospective model functions;
† secondly the ‘plethora of scenario development models’ noted in the introduction,
relates primarily to intuitive logics models and the ‘methodological chaos’ stems from
the fact that the methodological differences between some of these approaches in not
insigniﬁcant. Examining and categorising these approaches in terms of their differences
and similarities remains an open task.
7. Conclusions
As can be seen from the foregoing, although scenario techniques have a long history,
the application of them to strategic planning in the business context is a relatively new
phenomenon. This along with the observation that the growth in popularity of scenarios
has happened for practical reasons rather than theoretical ones may go some way to
explaining Khakee’s contention that scenarios have given rise to so much confusion. A
reasonable starting point in attempting to untangle this confusion is to understand the
historical origins and evolution of the three dominant schools of techniques and the
features which differentiate them, which is what this paper has attempted to do.
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